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PATENT LAW—BRINGING PREDICTABILITY BACK WITH THE
INTRACIRCUIT SPLIT PRONOUNCED IN RETRACTABLE TECHNOLOGIES, INC. V.
BECTON, DICKINSON & CO., 653 F.3D 1296 (FED. CIR. 2011): CLAIM
CONSTRUCTION AND UNPREDICTABLY LIMITING THE PATENTEE’S RIGHTS
I. INTRODUCTION
In the rapidly expanding entrepreneurial world of biotechnology, an
up-and-coming medical student at UAMS has recently secured a patent on a
precision laser device, which she will dedicate her life to developing, which
will revolutionize how doctors treat and eliminate cancerous tumors. Inspired by the loss of a close family member to cancer, she has been developing this cancer-killing device since taking Robotics in her junior year of
college. Two years after securing the patent and during the testing phase of
her invention, she discovers that without her consent her former lab partner
copied her design, reprinted her notes, and stole her idea. He secretly cloned
and then modified the device, and now he seeks to secure a patent of his
own. She knows that he is guilty of patent infringement, and she wants to
protect her legal rights, including the rights to exclusively market, produce,
license, and distribute the invention.
After consulting an attorney, she learns that her previous patent attorney, who compiled and secured the patent, used ambiguous language in constructing the necessary components of the patent. The new attorney tells her
that when certain language of the patent is ambiguous or unclear, the court
can be unpredictable in its determination of what constitutes the patentable
invention and thus what infringes upon that patent. At this point, she is not
sure what the court will consider to be her patented device or her legal rights
because the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit (“Federal
Circuit”) is not uniform in its methodology of analyzing ambiguous patent
language. The unpredictability and lack of uniformity leave her with more
questions than answers, and she wonders if pursuing litigation will even
render her the best results.
There is no denying that patents can be very arduous and complex.
Generally speaking, there are three primary parts of a patent: the specification, the drawings, and the claims.1 The claims and specification are the two
primary components relevant to this note. A patent must conclude with at
least one claim, which is a single sentence description that identifies the

1 1 ROBERT A. MATTHEWS, JR., ANNOTATED PATENT DIGEST § 1:21 (2008).

333

334

UALR LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 37

invention over which the patentee wants legal rights and exclusivity.2 The
single sentence of a claim identifies exactly what the patentee regards as
“its” own invention. The specification “includes drawings and textual descriptions of the invention” and describes the “embodiments of the invention,” which are specific blueprints to build and use the invention.3 Thus, the
specifications provide a step-by-step description and illustration of what the
invention looks like, how it is constructed, and how it is used. The claims
are single sentences that identify exactly what the patentee seeks to establish
legal rights over.4 When the words within the claims, the claim terms, are
ambiguous, the court will analyze the varying evidence in order to determine the meaning of the claim term; this is claim construction.5 Simply,
claim construction can be thought of as being analogous to statutory interpretation because both require interpretation of ambiguous language where
reasonable minds can reach very different conclusions.
The Federal Circuit is the appellate court of focus in this note regarding
matters of patent litigation on appeal. Although the Federal Circuit was created to provide predictability and uniformity, the court can be unpredictable
and lack uniformity in the methodology used in claim construction, which
can leave a patentee wondering exactly what rights he may have over his
patent.6 Predictability and uniformity have been well-known goals and objectives in the creation and interpretation of law throughout history. The
Federal Courts Improvement Act created the Federal Circuit with the goal of
establishing uniformity in patent law interpretation, including claim construction.7
Despite efforts to establish uniformity in the Federal Circuit, there has
been substantial uncertainty and unpredictability in claim construction within the Federal Circuit.8 According to a 2001 study by Judge Kimberly
Moore, now a judge in the Federal Circuit, the district courts have decided at
least one claim construction issue incorrectly in 33% of appealed cases, and
the Federal Circuit reversed or vacated the decision in 81% of cases where
the district court’s claim construction reached an incorrect conclusion.9 This
is a huge percentage of reversed and vacated judgments handed down from
a district court. Because the Federal Circuit has not established and adhered
2. Christopher A. Cotropia, What is the “Invention”?, 53 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1855,
1865 (2012).
3. Id. at 1866.
4. Id. at 1865.
5. See id. at 1865–66, 1879.
6. See Eifion Phillips, Comment, Phillips v. AWH Corp.: Reemphasizing Context in
Patent Claim Construction, 31 DEL. J. CORP. L. 957, 958–59 (2006).
7. Id. at 958.
8. Id.
9. Kimberly A. Moore, Are District Court Judges Equipped to Resolve Patent Cases?,
15 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 1, 11–13 (2001).
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to one specific methodology, patent litigants have faced extremely high reversal rates in the Federal Circuit, purportedly up to 47% in 2003–2004.10
Many argue that the particular claim construction methodology the
court employs in any given case depends largely on which judges are on the
panel and which ones are not, making it panel-dependent and very unpredictable.11 Moreover, when claim construction is not certain or definite, even
in the Federal Circuit, there is greater unpredictability and uncertainty that
can dictate how a person chooses to pursue infringement litigation and the
chances of success.12 Claim construction appeals can “lead[] to frustrating
and unpredictable results” for all parties involved, leaving litigants wondering exactly what rights they have over their patents and how the court will
construe their patents in litigation.13
This note examines the claim construction methodologies of the Federal Circuit as pronounced in the intracircuit split of Retractable Technologies., Inc. v. Becton, Dickinson & Co.14 (“Retractable I”) and Retractable
Technologies., Inc. v. Becton, Dickinson & Co.15 (“Retractable II”), as well
as the role of the specification in claim construction. The majority in Retractable I appears to transgress the precedent and guidelines of claim construction as promulgated by Phillips v. AWH Corp.16 (“Phillips”).17 The dissents in Retractable I and II assert that the majority deviated from its established method of claim construction and its approach cannot be reconciled
with Phillips.18 Phillips established that within the rules of claim construction, the specification should not be used to import a limitation into the
claim term, but the specification should be used to interpret the meaning of a
claim term.19 The dissent in Retractable I maintains that the majority improperly used the specification to import a limitation into the claim term,

10. Phillips, supra note 6, at 959.
11. Stephanie Ann Yonker, Post-Phillips Claim Construction: Questions Unresolved, 47
IDEA: INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 301, 308–09 (2007).
12. See Moore, supra note 9, at 27–28.
13. See, e.g., Retractable Techs., Inc. v. Becton, Dickinson & Co., 659 F.3d 1369, 1370
(Fed. Cir. 2011) (denial of rehearing en banc) (Moore, J., dissenting) (noting the frequent
commentary, discussion, and analysis of the unpredictability and lack of uniformity in claim
construction appeals).
14. Retractable Techs., Inc. v. Becton, Dickinson & Co., 653 F.3d 1296 (Fed. Cir.
2011).
15. Retractable Techs., 659 F.3d 1369 (denial of rehearing en banc).
16. 415 F.3d 1303 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc) (establishing guidelines for conducting
claim construction).
17. Compare Retractable Techs., 653 F.3d at 1303–13, with Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1312–
20.
18. See Retractable Techs., 659 F.3d at 1370–73 (Moore, J., dissenting); Retractable
Techs., 653 F.3d at 1312–13 (Rader, C.J., dissenting).
19. See Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1323.
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thereby deviating from the guidelines of Phillips and limiting the rights of
the patentee.20
This note shows that the majority in Retractable I erred when it deviated from the well-established guidelines of Phillips and improperly and unpredictably limited the rights of the patentee. The dissent in Retractable I
and the majority in Phillips adhere to the correct claim construction methodology, and in order to increase predictability and uniformity, the Federal
Circuit should adhere to the claim construction methodology promulgated
by Phillips and avoid deviation from those guidelines. Compounding the
problem, the Federal Circuit reviews claim construction appeals de novo as
a matter of law, granting zero deference to the lower court, even when factual-based extrinsic evidence is utilized, and the lower court is better
equipped to analyze large amounts of factual based evidence.21
As essential background information, this note first examines the purpose of a patent, the relevant components of a patent, and the establishment
and role of the Federal Circuit. Next, the note discusses the claim construction process and standards of Phillips and the intracircuit split of Retractable
I and Phillips. This note then explains the concept of extrinsic versus intrinsic evidence, as well as the Federal Circuit’s de novo review of claim construction matters. In conclusion, the note analyzes the intracircuit split by
comparing and contrasting methodologies, established standards, extrinsic
evidence, and it concludes that the majority in Retractable I erred when it
deviated from the standards of Phillips by improperly using the specification
to limit the meaning of a claim term, which leads to unpredictable consequences for patent litigants.
II. BACKGROUND
This section begins by exploring the purpose of a patent, the components, and the Federal Circuit as the appellate court of focus. Next, this section explains claim construction, the standards of claim construction used by
the Federal Circuit, and the intracircuit split of claim construction methodology. Finally, this section shows that the courts should use extrinsic evidence when the intrinsic evidentiary record is inconclusive to resolve a
claim term ambiguity.

20. See Retractable Techs., 653 F.3d at 1311–13 (Rader, C.J., dissenting).
21. See Retractable Techs., 659 F.3d at 1370–73 (Moore, J., dissenting); Retractable
Techs., 653 F.3d at 131–13 (Rader, C.J., dissenting).
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What a Patent Represents, the Purpose, the Components, and the Federal Circuit

In the United States, a patent confers upon the patentee certain legal
rights that are established to help protect the patented invention.22 Recall
previously that the specification is composed of drawings and textual descriptions that provide a blueprint on how to duplicate the invention.23 The
specification is analogous to a food recipe in a cookbook that shows stepby-step how to reproduce and use the invention. The claims of a patent are
single-sentence descriptions that conclude the specification and identify the
invention and exactly what the patentee is claiming to have rights over.24
During patent litigation and prosecution for infringement, the court must
determine the specific rights that encompass the patent in order to determine
if those rights have been infringed upon.25 Upon appeal from the federal
district courts, the Federal Circuit is the primary appellate court and the
court of focus in this note.26
1.

The Purpose of a Patent

It is important to understand the necessity and significance of a patent
and its purpose because patents serve to confer on the patentee certain legal
rights to exclusively develop, produce, sell, market, distribute, license, and
provide an incentive to disclose “new scientific and technical developments.”27 Patents also serve to encourage innovation and development by
protecting the rights of the patentee from infringement by outside sources
such as duplication, reproduction, or modification.28 The protection of a patentee’s rights encourages innovation by protecting the fruits of the patentee’s labor from infringement and exploitation.29 Patents seek to “foster and
reward invention,” “promote[] disclosure of inventions,” and “assure that
ideas in the public domain remain there for the free use of the public.”30
Inventors, researchers, developers, investors, and academics need reassurance and confidence that their inventions and developments will be pro22. See generally Cotropia, supra note 2.
23. Id. at 1866.
24. Id. at 1865; Christian E. Mammen, Patent Claim Construction as a Form of Legal
Interpretation, 12 J. MARSHALL REV. INTELL. PROP. L. 40, 44 (2012).
25. See generally Cotropia, supra note 2.
26. Mammen, supra note 24, at 51.
27. 1 JOHN GLADSTONE MILLS III ET AL., PATENT LAW FUNDAMENTALS § 1:2 (2d ed.
2015).
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. Id. (quoting Thomas & Betts Corp. v. Panduit Corp., 138 F.3d 277, 284 (7th Cir.
1998)).
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tected from infringement.31 In order to foster and encourage research, development, and innovation, the United States must have a system of laws and
protections that affords these assurances.32 The purpose of United States
patent law is to ensure that a person who has invested time, energy, money,
and labor in developing a patentable product or process should be afforded
the benefit of that invention by having the legal right to exclude others from
the benefit of that invention.33
2.

The Relevant Components of a Patent: Specification and Claims

The two main, and most relevant, parts of a patent are the claim and the
specification.34 As previously discussed, a patent must end with at least one
claim, which is a single sentence that identifies the invention over which the
patentee wants legal rights and exclusivity.35 Also, the specification “includes drawings and textual descriptions of the invention” and describes the
“embodiments of the invention,” which can be used as a blueprint to build
and use the invention.36
The requirement of one or more claims and the specification are statutory requirements that, pursuant to established law, must be included in every patent.37 Statute 35 U.S.C. § 112(a) establishes the requirement that a
written specification must use “clear, concise, and exact terms” such that
“any person skilled in the art to which it pertains” can make and use the
same invention with the understanding of the meaning.38 Section 112(b)
requires the specification to conclude with one or more claims, which will
identify precisely what the inventor regards as the invention.39 Thus, this
statute requires a specification as well as one or more claims to identify in
clear and concise terms what the inventor seeks to enforce legal rights and
exclusivity over, and what is regarded as the invention.40
3.

The Role and Establishment of the Federal Circuit

Claim language and specifications can be difficult, technical, and extremely complex to dissect and analyze.41 Because of the specialization and
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.

See generally Phillips, supra note 6, at 957, 979.
See id. at 979.
MILLS ET AL., supra note 27, § 1:2.
See Cotropia, supra note 2, at 1865–66.
Id. at 1865.
Id. at 1866.
35 U.S.C § 112(a)–(b) (2013).
Id. § 112(a).
Id. § 112(b).
Id. § 112(a)–(b).
See generally Cotropia, supra note 2.
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technical aspect of patent infringement and claim construction, not every
court has jurisdiction over issues of patent law, specifically over patent infringement.42 Congress created the Federal Circuit, through the Federal
Courts Improvement Act of 1982, in order to provide an appellate forum
having exclusive jurisdiction specifically over patent law.43 The Federal
Circuit, therefore, serves as the exclusive appellate court for matters of patent law and patent cases when appealed from a federal district court.44 The
Federal Circuit will ultimately hear matters of patent infringement on appeal
regarding patent claim construction, and is the court of focus in this note.45
B.

When the Claim Term is Ambiguous: The Standard of Claim Construction and the Intracircuit Split

A patent infringement case on appeal requires the court to analyze and
interpret the claims and the specification in order to determine the patentee’s
precise legal rights and whether those rights have been infringed.46 When the
claim term or language is unambiguous, the court need not engage in further
analysis for that particular claim.47 However, when the claim term is ambiguous the court is required to engage in claim construction analysis in order
to determine what legal rights that claim will confer upon the patentee.48
Claim construction is the particular analysis that the court will undertake in
order to interpret and define the particular meaning of claim terms and claim
language.49 Phillips represents the Federal Circuit’s well-established guidelines of claim construction.50
1.

Phillips v. AWH Corp. Sets the Standard for Claim Construction
Methodology

Phillips sets the standard and guidelines for claim construction analysis
and provides a roadmap of how the court is to engage in claim construction
in order to provide uniformity and predictability.51 In Phillips, the court in-

42. See Joseph R. Re, Brief Overview of the Jurisdiction of the U.S. Court of Appeals for
the Federal Circuit Under § 1295(A)(1), 11 FED. CIR. B.J. 651, 651–52 (2002).
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. See id.
46. See Edward D. Manzo, How to Improve Patent Claim Interpretations, 22 FED. CIR.
B.J. 203, 204–13 (2012).
47. See id. at 203–12.
48. See id.
49. See Manzo, supra note 46, 203–212.
50. See Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc).
51. See id.
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terpreted, established, and reiterated all of the rules and guidelines to be
followed in conducting claim construction.52
The claims of a patent define the invention and what the patentee has a
legal right to exclude others from using.53 This principle has been recognized since 1836, when Congress first required that a specification include
one or more claims.54 Phillips states that the words contained in a claim “are
generally given their ordinary and customary meaning” when reading a patent.55 The ordinary and customary meaning of a term in patent law is “the
meaning that the term would have to a person of ordinary skill in the art in
question at the time of the invention.”56 The person of ordinary skill through
whose eyes the claim is construed—persons skilled in the field of the invention—must read the claim term in the context of the whole patent, including
the specification.57 However, the meaning of the claim term under these
guidelines may not be readily apparent, and the court then looks to other
sources to determine the meaning of the claim term.58 The court may look to
the words of the claims themselves, claim language, or the remainder of the
specification, all of which constitute intrinsic evidence.59 When the intrinsic
evidentiary record is insufficient to determine the meaning of the claim term
or language, the court may then look to extrinsic evidence, including expert
testimony, the dictionary meaning of terms, and prior trial court hearings
and proceedings, for example.60
The specification plays an important role, because claims do not stand
alone and must be analyzed and interpreted in view of the specification in
order to ascertain the whole written instrument.61 In fact, the specification is
highly relevant, and when the claim term is disputed, the specification is
usually dispositive in claim construction analysis, but not always.62
When the specification is not dispositive but is unclear or ambiguous,
the court must engage in claim construction to determine the whole meaning
52. See id. at 1311–24.
53. Id. at 1312 (quoting Innova/Pure Water, Inc. v. Safari Water Filtration Sys., Inc., 381
F.3d 1111, 1115 (Fed. Cir. 2004)) (citing Vitronics Corp. v. Conceptronic, Inc., 90 F.3d
1576, 1582 (Fed. Cir. 1996); Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 52 F.3d 967, 979–81
(Fed. Cir. 1995) (en banc)).
54. See id.
55. Id. (quoting Vitronics Corp., 90 F.3d at 1582) (citing Toro Co. v. White Consol.
Indus., Inc., 199 F.3d 1295, 1299 (Fed. Cir. 1999); Renishaw PLC v. Marposs Societa’ per
Azioni, 158 F.3d 1243, 1249 (Fed. Cir. 1998)).
56. Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1313 (citations omitted).
57. Id. at 1313 (citations omitted).
58. See id. at 1314 (citations omitted).
59. See id. at 1313–15 (citations omitted).
60. See id. at 1317–19 (citations omitted).
61. See id. at 1315.
62. Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1315 (citing Vitronics Corp. v. Conceptronic, Inc., 90 F.3d
1576, 1582 (Fed. Cir. 1996)).
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of the written instrument.63 The purpose of the specification is to enable others skilled in the art to make and use the invention, that is, to essentially
provide a blueprint of the invention.64 In cases of ambiguity, case law prescribes that the court should refer to the descriptive portion of the specification to ascertain the meaning of the claim term.65
In claim construction, the court seeks to determine the “scope of the actual invention” by analyzing the context of the patent as a whole rather than
“divorcing the claim language from the specification.”66 The court considers
the specification as a guideline in construing the claim term when determining the scope of the actual invention; that is, the claim term should not be
interpreted to mean something that the specification does not support.67
However, it is essential to understand that there is an important “distinction between using the specification to interpret the meaning of a claim
and importing limitations from the specification into the claim.”68 This quoted language means that the specification should not be used to improperly
limit the meaning of the claim term, but rather it should only be used for the
purpose of interpreting the meaning of a claim term. For example, if a claim
term in the precision laser device is written as a “laser refractor” and the
specification describes a “two-piece laser refractor,” the claim term should
not be limited in its interpretation to include only a “two-piece laser refractor” because that would import a limitation from the specification into the
claim term. The claim term should not be limited to the exact description or
embodiments of the specification.69 The specification is not to be used as
limiting language but rather as a helpful tool in construing a claim.70 Previous case law concludes that the court must focus on understanding what a
person of ordinary skill in the art would interpret the claim to mean and refrain from confining the meaning of a claim term to the specific embodiments described by the specification.71

63. See id. at 1315.
64. See id. at 1323 (citing Spectra-Physics, Inc. v. Coherent, Inc., 827 F.2d 1524, 1533
(Fed. Cir. 1987)).
65. Bates v. Coe, 98 U.S. 31, 38 (1878).
66. Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1323–24.
67. See id. at 1320–24.
68. Id. at 1323 (citing Comark Commc’ns, Inc. v. Harris Corp., 156 F.3d 1182, 1186–87
(Fed. Cir. 1998)).
69. Id. (citing Nazomi Commc’ns, Inc. v. ARM Holdings, PLC, 403 F.3d 1364, 1369
(Fed. Cir. 2005); Liebel-Flarsheim Co. v. Medrad, Inc., 358 F.3d 898, 906–08 (Fed. Cir.
2004); Teleflex, Inc. v. Ficosa N. Am. Corp., 299 F.3d 1313, 1327 (Fed. Cir. 2002); SRI Int’l
v. Matsushita Elec. Corp. of Am., 775 F.2d 1107, 1121 (Fed. Cir. 1985)).
70. See id.
71. See id. (citing Nazomi Commc’ns, Inc., 403 F.3d at 1369; Liebel-Flarsheim Co., 358
F.3d at 906–08; Teleflex, Inc., 299 F.3d at 1327; SRI Int’l, 775 F.2d at 1121).
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This means that the claim term should not be limited strictly to what
the specification describes.72 Improperly importing a limitation diminishes
the patentee’s rights, restricts her patented invention, and increases unpredictability by creating unintended consequences. In order to avoid importing
limitations from the specification into the claim, the court should adhere to
the notion that the purpose of the specification is to teach a person of ordinary skill in the art how to make and use the invention, not to provide limitations upon the claim term.73 This is a very important distinction and is the
crux of this note’s analysis. Retractable I, II, and Phillips represent an intracircuit split in which the dissents in Retractable I and II alleged that the
majority improperly imported a limitation from the specification into the
claim term, thereby deviating from the guidelines of Phillips.74 This deviation defies the standards set forth by Phillips.
2.

The Intracircuit Split: Claim Construction Methodology in Retractable I and the Dissents in Retractable I and II, and Whether a
Limitation was Improperly Imported—Background Case Law

Retractable I, Retractable II, and Phillips are the primary cases at hand
in examining the ambiguity in a claim term, claim construction, and the intracircuit split. In Retractable I, Becton, Dickinson and Company (BD),
referencing patented retractable syringe needles, argued that the claim term
“body” as a central housing of a syringe needle (the part of the needle that
contains any liquids to be injected) should be restricted to include only onepiece bodies.75 BD argued that the district court erred in construing the term
“body” as not limited to a single-piece structure and finding that the term
can include multiple-piece bodies.76 Retractable Technologies, Inc. (RTI)
countered that the ordinary meaning of “body” does not limit the term to a
one-piece structure.77 According to RTI, the use of the modifier “one-piece”
in specific instances indicated that the “body” was not intended to be exclusively one-piece but could contain multiple pieces; otherwise, the modifying
term “one-piece” would have been superfluous.78 The Federal Circuit agreed

72. See Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1323.
73. See id.
74. See generally Retractable Techs., Inc. v. Becton, Dickinson & Co., 659 F.3d 1369
(Fed. Cir. 2011) (denial of rehearing en banc); Retractable Techs., Inc. v. Becton, Dickinson
& Co., 653 F.3d 1296 (Fed. Cir. 2011); Phillips, 415 F.3d 1303.
75. See Retractable Techs., 653 F.3d at 1298–1300, 1304.
76. See id. at 1304.
77. Id.
78. See id.

2015]

BRINGING PREDICTABILITY BACK

343

with BD that the term “body” is limited to a one-piece structure when
viewed in light of the specification.79
The majority in Retractable I asserted that a court must view the claim
language in light of the specification to determine the proper construction of
the term.80 The construction of the term “body” being limited to a “onepiece body is required to tether the claims to what the specifications indicate
the inventor actually invented” because the specifications show the body
constructed as a single structure and only disclose embodiments that are
limited to a single-piece body.81 The majority limited the claim term to one
piece not by construing the term itself but by viewing the term in light of the
specification in order to “capture the scope of the actual invention.”82
The dissent argued that the majority improperly imported a limitation
from the specification into the claim term, which improperly limited the
rights of the patentee, RTI.83 The dissent in Retractable I (and Retractable
II), recognizing Phillips as the standard for claim construction methodology,
asserted that the claims themselves, not the specification, define the invention.84 The dissent believed that the term “body” and the claim language
were ambiguous and reiterated that the “[c]laim language is to be given its
ordinary . . . meaning, as understood by a person of ordinary skill in the
art.”85 In support of the dissents, the court in Phillips held that the court must
not improperly import a limitation from the specification into the claim but
should only construe the claim in light of the specification.86
There is clear disagreement in determining if the majority improperly
imported a limitation into the claim term and whether the claim construction
in this case violated the guidelines of claim construction set forth in Phillips.87 This is significant because if the majority in Retractable I did in fact
use the specification to limit the meaning of the claim, thereby violating the
rules of Phillips, then the patentee’s legal rights were improperly limited as
well. Based upon the methodology established by Phillips, the court should
79. Id. at 1305.
80. Id. at 1305 (citing Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1315 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en
banc)).
81. Retractable Techs., 653 F.3d at 1305.
82. See id. at 1304–05.
83. See id. at 1312–13 (Rader, C.J., dissenting).
84. Retractable Techs., Inc. v. Becton, Dickinson & Co., 659 F.3d 1369, 1370–71 (Fed.
Cir. 2011) (denial of rehearing en banc) (Moore, J., dissenting) (citing Phillips, 415 F.3d at
1312); Retractable Techs., 653 F.3d at 1312 (Rader, C.J., dissenting) (citing Phillips, 415
F.3d at 1312).
85. Retractable Techs., 653 F.3d at 1312 (Rader, C.J., dissenting) (citing Phillips, 415
F.3d at 1312–13).
86. See Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1323.
87. See generally Retractable Techs., 659 F.3d 1369 (Moore, J., dissenting); Retractable
Techs., 653 F.3d 1296 (Rader, C.J., dissenting).
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not use the specification to limit the meaning of a claim term, and the Federal Circuit is split in determining if Retractable I represents a deviation from
that methodology. Deviation from precedential methodology introduces and
compounds the element of unpredictability for patent litigants.
Parallel with the dissent in Retractable I, the dissenting opinion in Retractable II illustrated the intracircuit split regarding claim construction
methodology and the role of the specification. The judges here explicitly
acknowledged the existence of an intracircuit split in claim construction
methodology and the role of the specification.88 The dissenting judges declared that the majority decision in Retractable I cannot be reconciled with
Phillips and that Retractable I deviated from the claim construction methodology promulgated in Phillips.89
This split affirms the notion that the Federal Circuit is not uniform or
predictable in its methodology of claim construction as promulgated by the
guidelines of Phillips. This lack of uniformity and predictability can have
grave consequences for both parties in a patent infringement case in determining the legal rights of each party and what constitutes the patented invention. Improperly importing a limitation into a claim term will degrade
predictability and uniformity because the patented rights will be improperly
limited. It is paramount that predictability and uniformity be material goals
in both the creation and interpretation of law.
C.

When the Intrinsic Evidentiary Record is Inconclusive, Extrinsic Evidence is Needed

In conducting claim construction analysis, the court first looks to the
intrinsic evidentiary record consisting of claim language and the specification to construe the meaning of a claim term.90 However, the intrinsic record
is not always conclusive or dispositive in resolving ambiguity, and the court
can look to the extrinsic evidentiary record as a tool in claim construction
analysis, such as expert testimony, prior hearings, documentary evidence,
etc.91 Extrinsic evidence has an inherently factual component for which the
Federal Circuit’s standard of appellate review is de novo, granting zero deference to the lower court even on matters of factual inquiry.92

88. See Retractable Techs., 659 F.3d at 1373 (Moore, J., dissenting).
89. See id. at 1371–72.
90. See Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1312–17.
91. See id. at 1317–19.
92. See Retractable Techs., 659 F.3d at 1374–76 (O’Malley, J., dissenting) (reviewing
extrinsic evidence is factual in nature).
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It is improper to use extrinsic evidence in the claim construction analysis when the intrinsic evidence alone resolves an ambiguity.93 The trial
court, and the Federal Circuit, will only look to the extrinsic evidentiary
record if ambiguity exists after analyzing the intrinsic record to construe a
claim.94 When the claim language is still ambiguous after analyzing the intrinsic evidentiary record, extrinsic evidence can be useful in determining
the whole meaning of claim language; however, it is second to intrinsic evidence in the hierarchy.95
Comparatively, intrinsic evidence is more reliable because it is firsthand, primary evidence written into the patent.96 Although useful, extrinsic
evidence is not part of the patent and is not created for the purpose of expounding on the patent’s scope.97 Extrinsic evidence might not be written by
or directed towards a person skilled in the field of the patent and thus may
not reflect the understanding of the skilled artisan.98 Moreover, extrinsic
evidence can also suffer from bias that intrinsic evidence is not subject to,
because extrinsic evidence may be generated for the specific purpose of
patent litigation.99 Although it can be useful, extrinsic evidence cannot be
used to change or contradict the claim language itself or the specification; it
can only help in understanding the meaning of the claim terms, and when
the claim is unambiguous, extrinsic evidence should be given no weight.100
Phillips established intrinsic evidence as the most important source of evidence used in claim construction, while finding that extrinsic evidence is
secondary.101
III. ANALYSIS
The holder and owner of a patent must know the exact legal rights he
or she possesses over his or her invention when patent infringement is alleged. This is especially true in cases of patent infringement where the patentee’s legal rights may determine whether or not an outside party has in93. Vitronics Corp. v. Conceptronic, Inc., 90 F.3d 1576, 1583 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (citing
Pall Corp. v. Micron Separations, Inc., 66 F.3d 1211, 1216 (Fed. Cir. 1995); Hormone Research Found., Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., 904 F.2d 1558, 1562 (Fed. Cir. 1990)).
94. See id. at 1584.
95. See Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1317–19.
96. See id. at 1313–18.
97. Id. at 1318.
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. See Vitronics Corp. v. Conceptronic, Inc., 90 F.3d 1576, 1584 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (citing Southwall Techs., Inc. v. Cardinal IG Co., 54 F.3d 1570, 1578 (Fed. Cir. 1995); Markman
v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 52 F.3d 967, 979–81 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (en banc)).
101. See THE LITIG. COMM. OF THE INTELLECTUAL PROP. LAW ASS’N OF CHI., CLAIM
CONSTRUCTION IN THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT § 1:8 (Edward D. Manzo ed., 2012).
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fringed upon those rights. It is imperative that the patentee and the patent
attorney be able to adequately predict how the court will construe the claim
language and terms. Unpredictability and lack of uniformity exist when the
court is split on how to properly construe a claim term, and where zero deference is given to the lower court on matters of factual inquiry involving
extrinsic evidence. Claim construction utilizing extrinsic evidence is at least
partly a factual inquiry, and by granting zero deference to the lower court on
these factual inquiries, the Federal Circuit creates more unpredictability and
a lack of uniformity. Deviating from established claim construction guidelines increases the unpredictability of patent claim construction appeals to
the Federal Circuit, which is contrary to the purpose of establishing predictability in patent litigation.
A.

De Novo Review Utilizing Extrinsic Evidence Compounds the Unpredictability

If claim construction utilizing extrinsic evidence consists of sufficient
factual inquiry so as to make claim construction a mixed question of law and
fact, the Supreme Court has indicated that deference should be given to the
lower court on mixed questions of law and fact.102 Judge O’Malley, in the
Retractable II dissent, recognized that claim construction using extrinsic
evidence requires a factual inquiry and consists of an inherently factual
component.103 Because extrinsic evidence can be extensive, including prior
testimony and hearings sometimes extending for several days, the trial court
is better equipped to acquire and evaluate such massive amounts of evidence.104 Analyzing and utilizing extensive documentary evidence sounds
much more like a factual inquiry than a legal inquiry.105 The court must recognize the obvious factual inquiry rather than brushing it off as a question of
law and affording no deference to the lower court.106 There is clearly a factual component of claim construction when using extrinsic evidence, because extrinsic evidence itself contains factual components.107
By not recognizing the factual component of claim construction when
using extrinsic evidence, the Federal Circuit exacerbates the problem of
unpredictability by granting zero deference to the lower court, which is usu-

102. See Retractable Techs., Inc. v. Becton, Dickinson & Co., 659 F.3d 1369, 1374 (Fed.
Cir. 2011) (denial of rehearing en banc) (O’Malley, J., dissenting) (citing Salve Regina College v. Russell, 499 U.S. 225, 233 (1991)).
103. See id. at 1374–76.
104. See id.
105. See id. at 1375–76.
106. See id. at 1373–76.
107. See id. at 1374–76.
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ally more equipped to determine questions of fact.108 In Cybor Corp. v. FAS
Technologies, Inc.,109 the Federal Circuit held that claim construction is
purely a matter of law and is reviewed de novo on appeal, which includes
any fact-based questions or inquiries.110 In affirming this decision, the Federal Circuit looked to the Supreme Court decision in Markman v. Westview
Instruments, Inc. (“Markman II”),111 which held that claim construction is
purely a matter of law to be decided by a judge, not a jury.112 The decision in
Cybor effectively abrogated any prior decisions or language purporting that
claim construction is a mixed question of law and fact and set in stone the
notion that claim construction is purely a matter of law to be reviewed on
appeal de novo.113
However, there is much argument and debate surrounding the assertion
that claim construction is purely a matter of law that resulted from Cybor,
even within the Federal Circuit.114 Many scholars, professors, lawyers, and
even Federal Circuit judges believe that claim construction contains elements of factual inquiry, especially when considering extrinsic evidence,
and this postulation brings into question the issue of de novo review of factual inquiry.115 Patent law expert, Professor Peter S. Menell of U.C. Berkeley School of Law, argues that the Federal Circuit erroneously concluded, in
Cybor, that claim construction matters must be reviewed de novo regardless
of any factual underpinnings.116 Professor Menell asserts that the court misapprehended the mixed fact and law nature of claim construction as being
purely a matter of law and concludes that there is a factual inquiry involved
in claim construction that must be recognized.117 This means that the court
must recognize the factual nature of claim construction when extrinsic evidence is involved.
The review and analysis of extrinsic evidence contains matters of factual inquiry because it looks beyond the patent to outside sources, which are
inherently fact based.118 Nonetheless, even against much disagreement and
dissent from the legal world, the Federal Circuit continues to review matters
108. See Retractable Techs., 659 F.3d at 1374–76 (O’Malley, J., dissenting).
109. 138 F.3d 1448 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (en banc).
110. Id. at 1456.
111. Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370 (1996).
112. See id. at 372; Cybor Corp., 138 F.3d at 1451 (citing Markman, 517 U.S. 370).
113. See Cybor Corp., 138 F.3d at 1456.
114. See Retractable Techs., Inc. v. Becton, Dickinson & Co., 659 F.3d 1369, 1373–76
(Fed. Cir. 2011) (denial of rehearing en banc) (O’Malley, J., dissenting).
115. See id.
116. See Brief of Professor Peter S. Menell as Amicus Curiae Supporting Lighting Ballast
Control LLC at 2–3, Lighting Ballast Control LLC v. Philips Elecs. N. Am. Corp., 500 F.
App’x 951 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (Nos. 2012–1014, 2012–1015) [hereinafter Menell].
117. See id. at 2–6.
118. See Retractable Techs., 659 F.3d at 1374–76 (O’Malley, J., dissenting).
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of claim construction de novo per Cybor.119 This means that even in matters
of claim construction where extrinsic evidence is utilized to construct the
claim language, the Federal Circuit reviews the matter de novo with zero
deference to the lower court, and the lower court is often more capable and
better equipped to analyze and review such vast amounts of factual evidence.120 Additionally, the Supreme Court has held that courts must use a
deferential standard of review when reviewing mixed questions of law and
fact.121 Giving zero deference to the lower court on factual matters of claim
construction fosters unpredictability and a lack of uniformity in conjunction
with the intracircuit split on proper claim construction methodology.
Many in the legal community argue that claim construction is one area
where the Federal Circuit has erroneously treated factual matters of claim
construction as questions of law.122 The evaluation and review of extrinsic
evidence seems to be a factual inquiry, at least in part, and not solely a question of law because much of extrinsic evidence consists of matters of fact
and factual components.123 Judge Mayer of the Federal Circuit asserts that
claim construction is not devoid of any factual component, but rather claim
construction inherently contains matters of factual inquiry.124 Claim construction, particularly when reviewing extrinsic evidence, requires questions
and inquiries of fact because of the factual nature of extrinsic evidence such
as prior hearings and expert testimony.125 Professor Peter S. Menell recognizes that extrinsic evidence is inherently factual in nature, which undermines the notion that claim construction is a pure question of law; rather
there is indeed a factual component.126
The problem lies in the fact that the Federal Circuit grants zero deference to the district court on matters of claim construction involving the
analysis and interpretation of extrinsic evidence, which contains factual
components.127 Judge Moore of the Federal Circuit stated that the Federal
119. See id. at 1373–76.
120. See id.; Menell, supra note 116, at 2–3.
121. Retractable Techs., 659 F.3d at 1374 (O’Malley, J., dissenting) (citing Salve Regina
College v. Russell, 499 U.S. 225, 233 (1991)).
122. See Paul R. Gugliuzza, The Federal Circuit as a Federal Court, 54 WM. & MARY L.
REV. 1791, 1831–33 (2013).
123. See Retractable Techs., 659 F.3d at 1375–76 (O’Malley, J., dissenting); Gugliuzza,
supra note 122, at 1832.
124. See Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1330–34 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc)
(Mayer, J., dissenting).
125. See id. at 1332.
126. See Peter S. Menell et al., Patent Claim Construction: A Modern Synthesis and
Structured Framework, 25 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 711, 726 (2010) (explaining that claim
construction is not a pure question of law and when extrinsic evidence is being introduced
into the analysis, the inquiry becomes a factual inquiry).
127. See Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1331–34 (Mayer, J., dissenting); Gugliuzza, supra note
122, at 1832–34.
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Circuit is not well suited to review issues of factual determinations without
giving deference to the lower court.128 The court’s decision in Cybor to regard all claim construction matters as questions of law reviewed with zero
deference “was ill considered . . . and has not proven ‘beneficial.’”129 In fact,
the district court is better equipped than the Federal Circuit and it has the
tools to evaluate large amounts of extrinsic evidence.130 The Federal Circuit
compounds the unpredictability and lack of uniformity in appellate claim
construction matters because the lower court is given zero deference on
what appear to be mixed questions of law and fact.131 The dissent in Retractable II and many commentators recognize the mixed question of law
and fact inherent in claim construction using extrinsic evidence, and by
granting zero deference to the lower court, the Federal Circuit may exclude
or give a disproportionate weight to the extrinsic evidence and come to a
different conclusion than the district court.132
The conclusions drawn by the Federal Circuit from claim construction
using extrinsic evidence may be very different than the conclusions drawn
by a district court. When the district court is better positioned to handle
large amounts of extrinsic evidence, the Federal Circuit should give its conclusions weight and deference because that will help provide uniformity and
increase the predictability of patent litigation. A scenario where the Federal
Circuit reaches a completely different result and conclusion than a district
court upon the review of extrinsic evidence further increases the unpredictability of claim construction.
On the other hand, Douglas Y’Barbo argues that conclusions reached
from the extrinsic evidence are in fact entitled to deference by the Federal
Circuit and the Federal Circuit does not review district courts’ conclusions
drawn from extrinsic evidence de novo.133 However, this assertion directly
defies Cybor, which stated that claim construction is a matter of law that is
reviewed without deference to district court conclusions, even when extrinsic evidence is considered in the district court’s conclusion.134 Cybor does
not carve out an exception for deference when extrinsic evidence is utilized

128. Moore, supra note 9, at 16.
129. Retractable Techs., Inc. v. Becton, Dickinson & Co., 659 F.3d 1369, 1374 (Fed. Cir.
2011) (denial of rehearing en banc) (O’Malley, J., dissenting) (quoting Cybor Corp. v. FAS
Techs., Inc., 138 F.3d 1448, 1463 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (en banc) (Plager, J., concurring)).
130. See Cybor Corp., 138 F.3d at 1477 (Rader, J., dissenting in part and concurring in
part); Douglas Y’Barbo, Is Extrinsic Evidence Ever Necessary to Decide Claim Construction
Disputes? Part II, 82 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 101, 102 (2000).
131. See Retractable Techs., 659 F.3d at 1373–75 (O’Malley, J., dissenting).
132. See id. at 1370, 1373 (Moore, J., dissenting).
133. See Y’Barbo, supra note 130, at 103.
134. See Cybor Corp., 138 F.3d at 1455–56.
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and analyzed by the district court in reaching its conclusion, which rebuts
Mr. Y’Barbo’s conclusion.135
As an example, in the case of Bausch & Lomb, Inc. v. BarnesHind/Hydrocurve, Inc., the Federal Circuit reached a different conclusion
than the district court based upon the extrinsic evidentiary record.136 In essence, the Federal Circuit granted zero deference to the district court and
disagreed with its interpretation of the extrinsic evidentiary record even
though the lower court is better equipped to interpret extrinsic evidence.137
The patent litigants in this case likely did not predict that the Federal Circuit
would reach a completely different conclusion than the district court. The
district court was likely in a better position to review and analyze the extrinsic evidentiary record in construing the claim.
The Federal Circuit could have generated a more predictable outcome
by granting some deference to the lower court on factual matters that exist in
claim construction with extrinsic evidence. Although the Federal Circuit
would not always reach the same conclusion as the district court, the granting of some deference would decrease the extraordinarily high reversal rate
for which the Federal Circuit is notorious. It stands to reason that because
the district court is presented with vast amounts of extrinsic evidence intertwined with factual inquiry, the Federal Circuit should grant some deference
to the lower court. This deference would increase predictability by ensuring
that the Federal Circuit takes into account the district court’s ability to better
handle large amounts of factual evidence, and thereby decrease the high
reversal rate. If the conclusions drawn by the Federal Circuit hinge on the
utilization of extrinsic evidence, the Federal Circuit would pay homage to
the goal of predictability by acknowledging and granting deference to the
lower court.
The Federal Circuit’s conclusions can be very unpredictable when the
claim construction is based upon extrinsic evidence. This is precisely the
lack of predictability and uniformity that is a result of reviewing all matters
of claim construction as questions of law with zero deference when it appears to be a mixed question of law and fact. Patent litigants may get unpredictable results between the Federal Circuit and the district court, which
increases unpredictability and lack of uniformity in patent litigation.

135. See id.
136. See Bausch & Lomb, Inc. v. Barnes-Hind/Hydrocurve, Inc., 796 F.2d 443, 450–51
(Fed. Cir. 1986).
137. See id.
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Retractable I and Retractable II: Providing a More Thorough Look

Separate from the use of extrinsic evidence and de novo review, this
note now discusses the issues associated with claim construction methodologies. The court’s construction of a claim term will determine what constitutes the patent and patentable rights. Retractable I held that the claim term
“body,” which is the central part of a syringe that holds the liquid to be injected, should be limited to include only “one-piece bodies” because this
was the only construction that comported with the specifications.138 The
court looked to the specifications and determined that because the specifications only disclosed one-piece bodies, the claim term “body” must be limited to that construction.139 However, the dissent asserted that construing a
claim term in order to comport with the court’s view of the specification is
erroneous and not supported by Phillips.140 The dissent argued that under the
rules of Phillips and the doctrine of claim differentiation, the claim term
“body” should not be limited to include only one-piece bodies but should
also include multiple-piece bodies.141 The majority’s improper limitation of
the claim term “body” consequently limited the rights of RTI to what the
court considered to be the patented invention.142
The relevant issue in Retractable I was the interpretation of the claim
term “body” within a patent for a retractable syringe needle.143 On appeal,
BD asserted to the Federal Circuit that the district court erred by concluding
that the term “body” should not be limited to a one-piece body but should
include multiple-piece bodies.144 RTI argued that even though the specification discloses a “one-piece body,” the claim term should not be limited to
only one-piece bodies because the claims also refer simply to “body” as well
as “one-piece bodies.”145 The multiple usage of the term indicates that it was
not intended to be limited to only one-piece bodies, otherwise the claims
would only mention one-piece bodies and not include the more open, unlimited term of just “body.”146 If the inventor only intended the term “body” to
include one-piece bodies, then the claims would only reference one-piece
bodies.147 The court’s construction of the claim term “body” ultimately de138. See Retractable Techs., Inc. v. Becton, Dickinson & Co., 653 F.3d 1296, 1305 (Fed.
Cir. 2011).
139. See id.
140. See Retractable Techs., Inc. v. Becton, Dickinson & Co., 659 F.3d 1369, 1371 (Fed.
Cir. 2011) (denial of rehearing en banc) (Moore, J., dissenting).
141. See Retractable Techs., 653 F.3d at 1312–13 (Rader, C.J., dissenting).
142. See id.
143. See id. at 1298, 1304–05 (majority opinion).
144. Id. at 1304.
145. See id.
146. See id. at 1312–13 (Rader, C.J., dissenting).
147. See Retractable Techs., 653 F.3d at 1312–13 (Rader, C.J., dissenting).
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termined what constitutes RTI’s patent, whether RTI has legal rights over
multiple-piece bodies or just one-piece bodies of the syringes, and thus
whether its patent was infringed upon.148
1.

The Retractable I Majority’s Holding and Reasoning That the
Claim Term Should be Limited

This section will look in detail at the majority holding in Retractable I
and its improper limitation of a claim term, which resulted in the improper
limitation of the patentee’s rights. This limitation of the patentee’s rights
exemplifies the unpredictability in claim construction methodologies within
the Federal Circuit. In Retractable I, the majority concluded that the specifications had to be reviewed in order to properly construe the ambiguous term
“body” and held that the term was limited to a “one-piece body.”149 Reviewing the exact language and written descriptions, “[t]he specifications indicate that the [claim term] ‘body’ refers to a ‘one-piece body,’” and they state
that the syringe “features a one piece hollow body.”150 The drawings and
figures presented by the specifications delineate a syringe with a one-piece
body and do not depict a multiple-piece body.151 There is nothing in the
specification language to suggest that the term “body” was intended to mean
anything other than a “one-piece body.”152 However, this does not mean that
the specification should limit the claim term to mean only what the specification discloses because the specification should not be used to limit a claim
term but only to interpret a claim term.153 It is important to know what the
specification discloses in order to understand how the majority uses it to
limit the claim-term “body.”
The court proclaimed to adhere to the standard rules of claim construction, as promulgated by Phillips, that claim construction requires more than
interpreting the claim term in isolation; it must be read in view of the specification.154 The court here recited the rules of Phillips by stating that claim
construction should not improperly import a limitation from the specification into the claims.155 Also, the court should try to capture the scope of the
actual invention and should not strictly limit the claim to disclosed language
148. See id. at 1304–07 (majority opinion).
149. See id. at 1305.
150. Id.
151. Id.
152. See id.
153. See Retractable Techs., Inc. v. Becton, Dickinson & Co., 659 F.3d 1369, 1370–73
(Fed. Cir. 2011) (denial of rehearing en banc) (Moore, J., dissenting); Retractable Techs., 653
F.3d at 1312–13 (Rader, C.J., dissenting).
154. Retractable Techs., 653 F.3d at 1305 (citing Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303,
1315 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc)).
155. See id. (citing Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1323).
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or allow the claim language to become divorced from the scope of the specification.156
In holding that the claim-term “body” should be limited to only onepiece structures, the majority looked to the specification and concluded that
because the specification only recites or describes one-piece bodies, the
claim term must therefore be limited to what the specification describes.157
According to the court, the construction of “body” must be limited to a onepiece body because the scope of the specification that refers to a one-piece
body limits the meaning of the term.158 The court admittedly notes that although the claims themselves do leave open the possibility that “body” could
mean multiple-piece bodies, the specifications direct the construction to
encompass only “one-piece” bodies.159 The dissent and the precedential
rules of Phillips disagree with the majority’s conclusion that purports to
limit the claim term and thereby improperly limit the patentee’s rights.160
2.

The Dissent’s Reasoning in Retractable I and II and the Doctrine
of Claim Differentiation

The dissenters in Retractable I and II fundamentally disagreed with the
majority regarding its construction of the claim term at issue.161 Using the
rules established in Phillips, and determining “[t]he ordinary and customary
meaning of ‘body,’” the Retractable I dissent argued that the claim term
does not contain a one-piece limitation and neither the claim language nor
the written description supports the notion that the inventor intended to limit

156. See id. (citing Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1323–24).
157. See id. (asserting that the term “body” must be limited to a one-piece body in order
“to tether the claims to what the specifications indicate the inventor actually invented”). The
dissent argues that this improperly limits the claim term and that the claim terms should not
be “tethered” to the specifications, thereby violating the rules of Phillips. See id. at 1311–13
(Rader, C.J., dissenting).
158. See id. at 1305 (the specifications only refer to one-piece bodies and thus limit the
meaning of the claim term).
159. See id. (concluding that even though the claim language leaves open the possibility
of multiple-piece bodies, the specifications guide the construction of the term to include only
one-piece bodies). The dissent uses the doctrine of claim differentiation to show that when
the claim language has two different meanings, dependent and independent claims, the court
should not import a limitation from one claim term into the adjacent claim. See id. at 1312
(Rader, C.J., dissenting). This condition suggests that although one claim may state “body,”
and the other claim states “one-piece body,” the court may not import the one-piece limitation into the other claim.
160. See Retractable Techs., 653 F.3d at 1312–13 (Rader, C.J., dissenting).
161. See Retractable Techs., Inc. v. Becton, Dickinson & Co., 659 F.3d 1369, 1370–73
(Fed. Cir. 2011) (denial of rehearing en banc) (Moore, J., dissenting); Retractable Techs., 653
F.3d at 1311–13 (Rader, C.J., dissenting).
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the body to a one-piece structure.162 The ordinary meaning of the term
“body” is clear and commonly understood, and it is not ambiguous; therefore, the specification is not needed in order to determine the meaning.163
The dissent claimed that it is improper to limit the term where the meaning
is clear and further, that it is erroneous to import a limitation from the specification in order to tether the claim to the majority view of the scope of the
intended invention.164 Thus, the deviation from the rules of Phillips improperly limited the rights of the patentee, and such deviation fosters unpredictability, because there is no way for a patent litigant, like RTI, to know when
the Federal Circuit will adhere to precedent or deviate at its whim.
The dissent argues that the majority also disregarded the doctrine of
claim differentiation and the conclusion that this doctrine would have rendered.165 Simply put, the doctrine of claim differentiation provides that a
dependent claim with a particular limitation does not limit an independent
claim.166 Specifically, “the presence of a dependent claim that adds a particular limitation gives rise to a presumption that the limitation in question is
not present in the independent claim.”167 For example, the dependent claim
“square laser refractor” should not limit the independent claim “laser refractor” to only include a square-shaped laser refractor. By not limiting the independent claim “laser refractor” to any particular shape, the patentee has
purposefully not limited its invention to include only square laser refractors,
but rather the patentee has left open the term laser refractor to include another feasible shape other than square. This rule takes on particular importance when one party seeks to limit the patentee’s rights by importing the
limitation from the dependent claim into the independent claim.168 That is
exactly the situation in this case, where BD sought to limit the term, and the
majority does, in fact, import the limitation from the dependent claim into
the independent claim.169

162. See Retractable Techs., 653 F.3d at 1312 (Rader, C.J., dissenting) (stating that the
majority should not limit the term because the ordinary meaning of the term does not include
a one-piece limitation and there is nothing to suggest that was the intent of the inventor).
163. See id. (stating that the majority should not have used the specification in the instant
case because the meaning of the term is clear).
164. See id. at 1311–12 (discussing the court’s importation of limitation from the specification, whereby the majority limits the rights of the patentee and the patented invention,
which accordingly can lead to unpredictable and unintended consequences for the patentee).
165. See id. at 1312–13.
166. See id. at 1312 (quoting Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1315 (Fed. Cir.
2005) (en banc)).
167. Id. (quoting Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1315).
168. See SunRace Roots Enter. Co. v. SRAM Corp., 336 F.3d 1298, 1303 (Fed. Cir.
2003); Ecolab Inc. v. Paraclipse, Inc., 285 F.3d 1362, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
169. See Retractable Techs., 653 F.3d at 1312 (Rader, C.J., dissenting).

2015]

BRINGING PREDICTABILITY BACK

355

Under the claim differentiation doctrine, the court cannot import a limitation from the dependent claim “one-piece” into the independent claims of
“body.”170 A court acknowledging and applying the doctrine of claim differentiation should hold that the claim term should not be limited by another
claim term, but rather it should be viewed independently so as to encompass
both meanings of the term.171 Properly applying the rules and analysis of
Phillips, the court should conclude that the claim term is not limited by another claim term, or by the specification, and that any such limitation placed
upon the patentee’s rights is improper.172 Because the Federal Circuit randomly defies the precedent of Phillips, patent litigants cannot predict when
the court will adhere to Phillips, acknowledge the doctrine of claim differentiation, or unpredictably distort the rules to fit the court’s own view of what
the patent should entail. This important analysis of claim differentiation gets
to the heart of the dissent’s opinion, that the majority improperly imported
this limitation into the term “body” and limited the rights of RTI.173
The doctrine of claim differentiation is sufficient to establish the proper
construction of the term “body” even when the court reads it in light of the
specification, because the court is not to use the specification as a limiting
factor but alternatively, as a useful part of the intrinsic record.174 The court
cannot use the specification to narrow a claim term or deviate from its plain
and ordinary meaning.175 The specifications do not provide a special definition to restrict the term “body,” and although the embodiments described in
the specifications contain one-piece bodies, that alone is an insufficient basis
for limiting the term “body” to a one-piece.176 Here, the majority improperly
used the specification to determine what it viewed as the scope of the actual
invention and proceeded to limit the claim-term “body” as it deemed fit,
while simultaneously disregarding the doctrine of claim differentiation by
giving it only a passing nod.177

170. See id.
171. See id.
172. See id. at 1311–13.
173. See id.
174. See id. at 1312–13.
175. Retractable Techs., Inc. v. Becton, Dickinson & Co., 659 F.3d 1369, 1371 (Fed. Cir.
2011) (denial of rehearing en banc) (Moore, J., dissenting) (citing Phillips v. AWH Corp.,
415 F.3d 1303, 1316 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc); Teleflex, Inc. v. Ficosa N. Am. Corp., 299
F.3d 1313, 1327 (Fed. Cir. 2002); CCS Fitness, Inc. v. Brunswick Corp., 288 F.3d 1359,
1366 (Fed. Cir. 2002)).
176. Retractable Techs., 653 F.3d at 1312–13 (Rader, C.J., dissenting) (explaining that
although the specifications refer to one-piece bodies, that is not dispositive and conclusive
enough to justify limiting the claim term accordingly).
177. See Retractable Techs., 659 F.3d at 1371–72 (Moore, J., dissenting); Retractable
Techs., 653 F.3d at 1305.
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The dissents assert that their analysis is analogous and parallel to the
analysis in Phillips and makes clear that the majority opinion in Retractable
I cannot be reconciled with Phillips.178 The claim construction methodology
and holding in Retractable I are in disagreement with Phillips, and the majority erred when it imported a limitation from the specification into the
claim term. Courts and patent litigants regard Phillips as establishing proper
claim construction methodology, and thus, they may analyze their legal
strategies, chances of success, patented rights, and predicted outcomes based
upon these guidelines. When the Federal Circuit deviates from this recognized methodology, lower courts and litigants cannot accurately predict the
outcome because the Federal Circuit has misconstrued established precedent, or in some instances, such as claim differentiation in Retractable I, the
Federal Circuit has blatantly ignored it. This distortion makes patent law and
litigation, particularly on appeal to the Federal Circuit, very unpredictable,
and it lacks the desired uniformity concerning all involved parties.179 The
intracircuit split in claim construction methodology introduces an element of
unpredictability, which can have dire consequences for a patent litigant
when the court hands down unforeseen results.180 The inconsistent and unpredictable methodology employed by the Federal Circuit defies the goal of
predictability and uniformity.181 One major goal in creating the Federal Circuit was to increase uniformity and consistency; however, the Federal Circuit arbitrarily juggling between methodologies undermines that goal.182
Adhering to one specific and established methodology with consistency
would increase the predictability of patent litigation and reduce the number
of reversals and appeals, while promoting settlement.183
C.

A Closer Look at Phillips and a Comparison With Retractable I

The court in Phillips clarified the guidelines of claim construction
promulgated by past precedent, and the Federal Circuit still recognizes Phillips as the standard for claim construction rules.184 In Phillips, Mr. Phillips
brought suit against AWH Corp., alleging infringement of patent claims,
among other claims.185 Mr. Phillips invented modular, steel-shell panels that
178. See Retractable Techs., 659 F.3d at 1371–72 (Moore, J., dissenting); Retractable
Techs., 653 F.3d at 1312–13 (Rader, C.J., dissenting).
179. See Yonker, supra note 11, at 308–09.
180. See id.
181. See id. at 323.
182. See Phillips, supra note 6, at 958–59.
183. See Yonker, supra note 11, at 323, 331.
184. See Retractable Techs., 653 F.3d at 1303–05; Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d
1303, 1311–24 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc).
185. Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1309.

2015]

BRINGING PREDICTABILITY BACK

357

were designed to be impact resistant, and one component of these panels is
the “baffle,” which was the claim term at issue in Phillips.186 Specifically,
the panels are comprised of baffles that are described as “internal steel baffles extending inwardly from the steel shell walls.”187 Here, it is more important to understand the proposed function of the panels and baffles, which
is to be impact resistant and deflect projectiles,188 than it is to understand the
exact appearance or demeanor of a baffle.
Comparable to the dissent in Retractable I, the majority in Phillips
looked to the doctrine of claim differentiation, which dictates that the presence of a dependent claim, adding a particular limitation, presumes that the
limitation does not exist in the independent claim.189 A dependent claim that
limits the baffle to angles that exclusively deflect projectiles, angles not 90°,
should not limit an independent claim that does not limit the baffle to a particular angle.190 By specifying in one instance that the baffle should deflect
projectiles does not mean that every baffle must serve that purpose and thus
be constructed at that particular purpose-serving angle.191 Here, specific
claims within the patent specify particular functions of the baffles, such as a
dependent claim which states that baffles may be “oriented with the panel
sections disposed at angles for deflecting projectiles such as bullets able to
penetrate the steel plates.”192
The underlying assumption here is that baffles at right angles (90°) do
not “deflect” projectiles but rather halt motion and momentum altogether,
and in order to deflect projectiles, the baffle must be at an angle other than
90°. The language of a dependent claim limitation of being constructed at
angles for deflecting projectiles (angles other than 90°) indicates that the
patentee did not intend that the term “baffles” inherently contained that limitation, otherwise to specify would be superfluous.193 If the term baffles inherently contained that limitation, there would be no need to specify that
186. See id. at 1309–10.
187. See id.
188. See id. at 1310.
189. See id. at 1315 (citing Liebel-Flarsheim Co. v. Medrad, Inc., 358 F.3d 898, 910 (Fed.
Cir. 2004)) (stating the general rule of claim differentiation, which is cited and discussed in
Retractable I).
190. See id. at 1324–27.
191. See id.
192. See Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1324 (emphasis added).
193. See id. (citing Dow Chem. Co. v. United States, 226 F.3d 1334, 1341–42 (Fed. Cir.
2000) (“concluding that an independent claim should be given broader scope than a dependent claim to avoid rendering the dependent claim redundant,” which is to say that a limitation
provided by a dependent claim should not be read into an independent claim)). This is the
general rule of claim differentiation, and Phillips states that the court has “rejected the contention that if a patent describes only a single embodiment, the claims of the patent must be
construed as being limited to that embodiment.” Id. at 1323 (citing Gemstar-TV Guide Int’l,
Inc. v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 383 F.3d 1352, 1366 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
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particular limitation.194 The patentee included it in order to reflect the idea
that not every baffle will serve the function of deflecting projectiles, because
the person of ordinary skill would not understand baffles to be limited to
angles that deflect projectiles (not 90° angles).195 Adhering to the doctrine of
claim differentiation, the presence of the dependent claims that specify a
particular function (deflecting projectiles) should not be imported or assumed to be present in the independent claim term, “baffles.”196 Such a construction would improperly limit the claim term, and thus, the patentee’s
rights where the patentee did not intend to limit its invention or rights.197
Looking at the role of the specification, the dissent in Phillips cited that
the specifications themselves contained no illustrations, descriptions, or disclosure of baffles at right angles (90°) and there was no reference to baffles
at right angles.198 The specifications unequivocally made clear that the baffles are angled (not at right angles) and only referenced angled baffles.199
Compare this to Retractable I where the specifications disclosed only a
“one-piece” body, did not disclose multiple-piece bodies, and the majority
limited the claim term to what the specification disclosed.200 However, contradictory to the majority in Retractable I, the majority in Phillips declined
to limit the claim term, “baffle,” to the disclosed specifications and instead,
construed the term to its ordinary and plain meaning.201 This is an important
distinction, and a perfect illustration of how the majority in Retractable I
deviated from the analysis of Phillips.
This analysis of claim differentiation in Phillips is analogous to the
analysis of the dissents in Retractable I and II, in which both courts concluded that the limitation of a dependent claim does not import a limitation
194. See id. at 1325 (citing TurboCare Div. of Demag Delaval Turbomachinery Corp. v.
Gen. Elec. Co., 264 F.3d 1111, 1121 (Fed. Cir. 2001)).
195. See id. at 1324–25. The court infers that the person of ordinary skill would not understand the term to include only deflecting baffles; therefore, the patentee included the limitation in order to make the distinction that some baffles will serve to deflect projectiles while
others will not. See id. This is supported in the rest of the specification and claim language,
where baffles are described as having functions other than deflection. See id.
196. See id. at 1324–27 (this is the general proposition and rule abiding conclusion that
the majority accepts).
197. See id.
198. See Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1329 (Lourie, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
The dissent asserts that nothing within the specifications indicates, discloses, or illustrates
baffles at right angles, but instead the specifications only depict baffles at angles other than
right angles. See id. This is synonymous with the reasoning that the majority in Retractable I
gave for deciding to limit the term “body” to one-piece bodies, because the specifications
only depict one-piece bodies. See Retractable Techs., Inc. v. Becton, Dickinson & Co., 653
F.3d 1296, 1304–05 (Fed. Cir. 2011).
199. See Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1329 (Lourie, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
200. See Retractable Techs., 653 F.3d at 1305.
201. See Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1324–27.
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into the independent claim, so that the patentee’s rights are not inappropriately limited.202 Phillips stands for the notion that a claim term should not be
limited by another claim term or the specification, and this argument is
promulgated by the dissents in Retractable I and II.203 The patentee in Retractable I likely did not predict that the Federal Circuit would bypass Phillips and ignore the doctrine of claim differentiation en route to limiting the
patentee’s rights to what the court determined was the scope of the invention. This unpredictability and deviation from precedent renders litigants,
like the patentee in Retractable I, unable to accurately surmise what rights
they may possess or how the Federal Circuit will construct a claim upon
appeal.
Reflecting back to the previous discussion of the majority holding and
analysis in Retractable I, the court’s conclusion and reasoning disregarded
the doctrine of claim differentiation, while also importing a limitation from
the specification into the claim term.204 It is obvious that the Retractable I
court dismissed, or at the very least downplayed, the doctrine of claim differentiation, especially in comparison to Phillips.205
In Retractable I, the court acknowledged the existence of the limiting
dependent claim, “one-piece body,” and the independent claim, “body,” but
declared the implication that “body” is not limited to a one-piece body is a
weak implication.206 This assessment minimizes and overlooks the conclusions drawn from the doctrine of claim differentiation, and Phillips. In contrast to Phillips, Retractable I held that even though “the claims leave open
the possibility that . . . ‘body’ may encompass” multiple-piece bodies, thereby ignoring the doctrine of claim differentiation, and determined that the
claim-term should be limited to one-piece bodies in order to “tether the
claims to what the specifications indicate.”207 By properly adhering to the
analysis and guidelines established by Phillips, the majority in Retractable I
should have concluded that the presence of this limiting dependent claim
does not then automatically limit the independent claim, and the doctrine of
202. See Retractable Techs., Inc. v. Becton, Dickinson & Co., 659 F.3d 1369, 1371–72
(Fed. Cir. 2011) (denial of rehearing en banc) (Moore, J., dissenting); Retractable Techs., 653
F.3d at 1312–13 (Rader, C.J., dissenting); Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1324–27.
203. See Retractable Techs., 659 F.3d at 1371–73 (Moore, J., dissenting); Retractable
Techs., 653 F.3d at 1312–13 (Rader, C.J., dissenting); Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1324–27.
204. See Retractable Techs., 653 F.3d at 1304–05 (holding that the claim term should be
limited to what the dependent claim states and importing the limitation of a “one-piece” body
from the specification because the specification only depicts one-piece bodies).
205. See id. (glancing over the fact that a dependent claim and an independent claim exist
and, therefore, the dependent claim’s limitations should not be imported into the independent
claim); Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1324–27.
206. See Retractable Techs., 653 F.3d at 1305. This is in direct conflict with the doctrine
of claim differentiation established in Phillips and cited by the dissent in Retractable I.
207. See id.
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claim differentiation can only lead to the conclusion that the term “body”
should not be limited to only one-piece bodies.208 As evidenced, the majority
in Retractable I disregarded the analysis involving claim differentiation in
reaching its conclusion, and instead, it imported a limitation from the specifications, which is in direct conflict with the well-established guidelines of
Phillips.209
The majority in Retractable I not only declined to adhere to claim differentiation, or give it more than a passing nod; however, it also defied the
rules and guidelines of Phillips by improperly importing a limitation from
the specification into the claim-term “body.”210 The specifications in Phillips
are comparable to the specifications in Retractable I because, in both cases,
the specifications only depict one type or version of the claim term in question.211 Comparing the two conclusions drawn, unlike Phillips, the Retractable I court rejected the notion that if a specification describes a single embodiment, as it does in both cases at hand, the claim-terms should not be
construed as being limited to that embodiment.212 Rather than adhering to
Phillips and declining to import a limitation from the specification, the court
in Retractable I decided to limit the claim term in order to “tether the claims
to what the specifications indicate[d],” and thus, limited the rights of RTI.213
The dissents of Retractable I and II explained that the analysis and
holding in Retractable I were incorrect, the specification cannot be used to
narrow a claim term, and the court “cannot . . . redefine a claim term to
match [its] view of the scope of the invention” based upon the specification.214 According to the Retractable II dissent and its well-reasoned assessment, the majority in Retractable I rewrote the claim term in order to conform to the court’s belief of what the scope of the invention inhabits rather
than abiding by the doctrine of claim differentiation, the proper role of specifications, and the rules set forth by Phillips.215
208. See Retractable Techs., 653 F.3d at 1312 (Rader, C.J., dissenting); Phillips, 415 F.3d
at 1324–25. By adhering to the principles and analysis in Phillips, the court in Retractable I
should have declared that the term body is not limited to a one-piece body based upon the
doctrine of claim differentiation. Id.
209. See Retractable Techs., 653 F.3d at 1304–05; Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1324–27.
210. See Retractable Techs., 653 F.3d at 1305 (limiting the claim-term “body” to only
one-piece bodies, because the specifications only disclose one-piece bodies).
211. See id. (declaring that the specifications only disclose one-piece bodies); Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1329–30 (Lourie, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (declaring that
the specifications only depict angled baffles).
212. See Retractable Techs., 653 F.3d at 1305; Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1324.
213. See Retractable Techs., 653 F.3d at 1305 (basing its claim construction on language
not found in the rules of Phillips).
214. See Retractable Techs., Inc. v. Becton, Dickinson & Co., 659 F.3d 1369, 1371–72
(Fed. Cir. 2011) (denial of rehearing en banc) (Moore, J., dissenting); Retractable Techs., 653
F.3d at 1311–13 (Rader, C.J., dissenting).
215. See Retractable Techs., 659 F.3d at 1371–72 (Moore, J., dissenting).
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This intracircuit split represents a clear disconnect and lack of uniformity in how the Federal Circuit conducts claim construction when there
are both dependent and independent claims, and where the specifications
only disclose one version of the claim-term.216 The court in Phillips adhered
to its own rules, which are well recognized and established, while the court
in Retractable I deviated from those rules, importing a limitation from the
specification into the claim-term.217 This importation of a limitation upon the
claim-term is unwarranted under Phillips, and moreover, is unpredictable. In
order to establish more predictability and uniformity, the court must adhere
to the well-reasoned, and well-established, guidelines set forth in Phillips.
This intracircuit split highlights the lack of uniformity in the claim construction methodology and introduces an element of risk as well as lack of
predictability. The intracircuit split may have grave consequences for patent
litigants because there is no uniform method of claim construction, and the
parties are left in the dark as to how the court will construe particular claimterms. Unpredictability and a lack of uniformity leave patent holders, and
patent litigants, wondering exactly what rights they may or may not procure,
how the court will rule in a patent infringement case, and what general aspects of the patent are protected. Uniformity in claim construction was a
major goal of the Federal Courts Improvement Act,218 and the Federal Circuit would take a step toward achieving that goal by adhering to the established claim construction methodology promulgated by Phillips. A singular,
well-defined claim construction methodology would promote settlement,
reduce litigation, and increase the predictability and uniformity of patent
litigation.219
IV. CONCLUSION
The Federal Circuit was established, in part, to bring predictability to
patent litigation. However, contrary to this goal, the Federal Circuit has
achieved a reputation of being notoriously unpredictable in its patent litigation, particularly claim construction disputes. There are many proposed theories explaining the causes and effects of this unpredictability. Here, the
intracircuit split within the Federal Circuit, regarding claim construction
methodologies, underlines and increases unpredictability and a lack of uniformity. The Federal Circuit in Retractable I deviated from the wellestablished rules of Phillips and unnecessarily limited the claim-term
“body,” and as a consequence, the court unexpectedly limited the patentee’s
216.
217.
218.
219.

See Retractable Techs., 653 F.3d at 1304–05; Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1324–27.
See Retractable Techs., 653 F.3d at 1304–05; Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1312–27.
See Phillips, supra note 6, at 958.
See Yonker, supra note 11, at 323, 331.
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legal rights as well. The Federal Circuit also increases unpredictability by
reviewing matters of claim construction with extrinsic evidence as pure
questions of law, thereby granting zero deference under de novo review,
even though it is likely a mixed question of fact and law to which some deference should be granted. This apparent unpredictability and lack of uniformity can lead to unforeseen results and unclear expectations. Most importantly, it blurs the line on what the patentee regards as his or her rights
over the particular patented invention. In order to help achieve the goal of
bringing more predictability to patent litigation, the Federal Circuit should
adhere to the claim construction guidelines established by Phillips.
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